Section A
Uranium is not exchange-traded. There is no uranium equivalent of the LME or COMEX. Instead, prices are assessed weekly by two private consultancies — UxC and TradeTech — based on reported transactions and market intelligence. The spot price represents purchases for delivery within 12 months. The long-term contract price is the reference for utility supply contracts, typically covering 3–10 years of delivery. Both matter: the spot price moves first; the long-term price follows with a lag and is the one that actually determines mine project economics.
Key reference prices
$106/lb
Cycle peak (Jan 2024)
$48/lb
Cycle trough (2020)
$136/lb
Historical ATH (Jun 2007)
$7/lb
Post-Fukushima low (2016)
~$65/lb
Estimated incentive price (new mine)
—
Long-term contract (current)
—
U3O8 spot (current)
$82
U3O8 Spot
USD/lb · UxC weekly
$80
Long-Term Contract
USD/lb · UxC monthly
−23%
From Jan 2024 peak
$106/lb peak
+71%
From 2020 trough
$48/lb base
Section B
Before you can make sense of the uranium market, you need to see it as what it actually is: a six-stage industrial chain, not a single commodity. Uranium comes out of the ground as yellowcake. Then it gets converted to a gas (UF6). Enriched. Fabricated into fuel rods. Loaded into a reactor. Each stage has its own price, its own supply chain, and its own chokepoints. Investors who focus only on the mine price and ignore conversion and enrichment miss half the story — and the post-2022 SWU price spike was more explosive than the uranium price itself.
1
Mining
U3O8 ore → yellowcake
Price: UxC spot
›
2
Conversion
U3O8 → UF6 gas
~$22/kgU
›
3
Enrichment
Natural UF6 → enriched
~$155/SWU
›
4
Fuel Fabrication
Enriched UF6 → fuel pellets
Westinghouse, GNF
›
5
Reactor
Fuel → electricity
440 LWR units global
›
6
Spent Fuel
Storage + reprocessing
Secondary supply
Why uranium price recoveries lag mine economics
The fuel cycle means utilities sign contracts 18–36 months before delivery. A utility buying fuel today for a reactor loading in 2027 is signing contracts now — at long-term contract prices, not spot. When utilities are well-covered, spot demand evaporates. When they are under-contracted, they enter the spot market aggressively. The swing from “covered” to “uncovered” is the primary driver of uranium bull cycles — not mine supply alone.
Section C
Kazakhstan produces 43% of the world’s uranium. One company — Kazatomprom, state-owned — controls most of that. When Kazatomprom’s government sets annual RKAB mine quotas, it is effectively setting a supply ceiling for nearly half the world’s uranium output. No OPEC member has wielded equivalent power over their commodity since the 1970s. This section covers Kazatomprom’s production trajectory, the RKAB mechanism, and the logistics question that keeps utility fuel buyers awake at night: how do you get Kazakh uranium to Western reactors without it transiting Russia?
Kazatomprom export logistics: the Russia transit risk. Until the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) was established, essentially all Kazakh uranium exports transited Russia via rail. Post-2022, Kazatomprom has been actively re-routing exports via the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and Georgia, then onward. This route is longer and more expensive but eliminates Russian transit dependency. The transition is not fully complete — Russian transit of uranium was not explicitly banned under Western sanctions as of time of writing, but Western utilities have been reducing their reliance on it. Monitor Kazatomprom’s quarterly logistics disclosures.
Section E
The goldandsilvertracker.com database tracks 227 uranium assets across 10 countries — 66 producing, 40 in development, 108 in exploration, 10 in care & maintenance. The pipeline has been growing since the price recovery. But this is where uranium’s brutal lead-time problem is most visible: even projects that took FID in 2025–2026 are unlikely to produce before 2028–2030. The reactor fleet that is going to consume uranium in 2030 is already running or being built. The mines that will supply it are, mostly, not.
▶ Under construction
Phoenix ISR — Wheeler River
Denison Mines (TSX:DML / NYSEAMERICAN:DNN) · Saskatchewan
FID taken; construction started March 2026. First production target: 2028. Capacity: ~6 Mlbs/yr using proprietary SABRE ISR method. Unique: no mill required, in-situ recovery directly from Athabasca high-grade deposits. Gryphon underground component (5 Mlbs/yr) to follow.
⌛ CNSC review
Arrow Deposit — Rook I Project
NexGen Energy (TSX/NYSE:NXE) · Athabasca Basin, Saskatchewan
Largest undeveloped high-grade uranium deposit globally. Target capacity: 30 Mlbs/yr (could represent ~15% of projected global supply at full build). CNSC environmental assessment hearings ongoing. FID pending regulatory approval. Estimated timeline: production 2030+.
⌛ Commissioning target H2 2027
Dasa Uranium Project
Global Atomic (TSX:GLO) · Agadez, Niger
High-grade underground uranium mine. Capacity: 4.4 Mlbs/yr. Commissioning target H2 2027. US DFC (Development Finance Corporation) financing is the primary gating factor. Niger political situation adds country risk despite the mine being in Orano’s legacy infrastructure zone.
🚷 Ramp-up challenges
Langer Heinrich Phase 1–3
Paladin Energy (ASX/TSX:PDN) · Namibia
Restarted in early 2024. FY2025 production guidance withdrawn March 2025 after heavy rains and ore grade issues. Production rate: ~3.3 Mlbs/yr at name plate; ramp progress behind schedule. Two class actions filed by shareholders. Phase 2 expansion (8 Mlbs/yr capacity) contingent on resolving Phase 1 ramp. Fission Uranium (PLS/Triple R) acquired Nov 2024.
⌛ Development
Cigar Lake Zone 4 Extension
Cameco (TSX:CCO / NYSE:CCJ) · Saskatchewan
Extends Cigar Lake mine life. Target: 18 Mlbs/yr capacity on extension development. Cameco operating at 13.4 Mlbs/yr from main operation. Extension development underway. Key asset for Cameco’s 2028–2030 production profile.
⌛ PFS / Permitting
Triple R / PLS — Patterson Lake South
Paladin Energy / ex-Fission Uranium · Athabasca Basin
Acquired by Paladin from Fission Uranium (Nov 2024, C$1.14B). Planned capacity: 10 Mlbs/yr. Open pit + underground hybrid. Pre-feasibility ongoing. Paladin adding significant development-stage Athabasca exposure alongside Langer Heinrich operating asset.
Section F
The most important number in uranium is not the spot price. It is how many pounds of uranium utilities still need to buy for the next five years — their “uncovered requirements.” When that number is small, utilities are covered and can ignore the spot market entirely. When it is large, every utility is simultaneously calling every miner and asking the same question: what’s your long-term contract price? That competition is what drives uranium from $48/lb to $106/lb in less than three years. The spot market moves first; the long-term contract price follows as utilities exhaust willing sellers at lower levels.
The contracting cycle mechanism: why uranium bull markets are powerful
When coverage ratios drop below ~60% for Years 3–5, utilities typically begin new long-term contracting campaigns. Multiple utilities re-entering the market simultaneously — each needing to cover millions of pounds per year for a decade — creates demand surges that the spot market (which trades only ~25–30 Mlbs/yr in total) cannot absorb without significant price increases. This mechanism, not supply shortages alone, drove uranium from $7/lb to $136/lb in 2003–2007. The 2020–2024 cycle saw similar dynamics emerge as coverage ratios dropped and physical buyers (SPUT, Yellow Cake) competed with utilities for spot material.
—
U3O8 spot (current)
Section G
Uranium has no LFP problem. There is no battery chemistry shift that replaces uranium in a thermal fission reactor. A running reactor consumes roughly 1.5–2.5 Mlbs of U3O8 per year, and it has no alternative. That baseline demand is the starting point — and it only grows from here. China is building more reactors than the rest of the world combined. The UK, France, and the US are all reversing course on nuclear after a decade of retreat. The current global reactor fleet consumes approximately 175–180 Mlbs U3O8 per year. By 2035, that number is expected to reach 250–260 Mlbs.
440
Operating reactors
IAEA PRIS · Worldwide
65
Under construction
Add ~8 Mlbs/yr demand each
~175
Mlbs/yr demand
Current global consumption
~260
Mlbs/yr demand 2035E
IEA / WNA base case
SMRs: the next demand wave (post-2030)
Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are not a near-term uranium demand driver — commercial deployment is a 2030–2035 story at earliest. But they matter for the long-term uranium thesis because they expand the addressable market significantly beyond traditional grid-scale reactors. Key developers: NuScale (SMR, NYSE), Oklo (advanced fission, NYSE), Rolls-Royce (UK). Each SMR requires uranium enriched to 5–20% (HALEU in some designs, vs standard LWR <5%) — a different enrichment profile that also affects SWU demand.
Section H
Here is a number that surprises most people new to the uranium market: mines produce roughly 145–155 Mlbs U3O8 per year. Reactors consume roughly 175 Mlbs. The gap — 20–30 Mlbs — gets filled every year by sources that have nothing to do with new mining. Some of those sources are structural and permanent (enrichment tails re-enrichment). Some were temporary and are now exhausted (the Cold War HEU downblend programme that ended in 2013). Understanding what has been filling the gap — and how those sources are shrinking — is as important as understanding mine supply.
| Secondary source | Est. annual contribution | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enrichment tails re-enrichment | ~8–15 Mlbs/yr | Active | When SWU prices are low relative to uranium prices, enrichers re-enrich depleted uranium (tails) using excess centrifuge capacity. Creates “virtual” uranium supply. Responsive to the uranium/SWU price ratio. |
| Russian HEU downblend (legacy) | Largely complete | Programme ended 2013 | The 1993–2013 “Megatons to Megawatts” programme converted 500 tonnes of Russian HEU to reactor fuel. Supplied ~10–13% of world uranium annually for 20 years. Ending this programme was the primary cause of the 2006–2007 price spike. |
| Russian government stockpiles | Variable — ≤5 Mlbs/yr | Sanction-constrained | Russia retains large enrichment tails and natural uranium inventories. Post-August 2024 US import ban and November 2024 Russian export restrictions, the flow of Russian uranium to Western utilities has been constrained. Remaining deliveries under pre-existing contracts are in a legal grey zone. |
| US Department of Energy inventories | ~2–4 Mlbs/yr | Policy-driven | DOE releases uranium from excess inventories for cleanup programs and market sales. Subject to congressional oversight. The US Uranium Reserve programme (begun 2021) is purchasing domestic uranium to rebuild strategic stocks — net demand positive. |
| Utility inventory drawdown | ~5–10 Mlbs/yr | Now rebuilding | During 2014–2021, many Western utilities ran down uranium inventories built post-Fukushima. Those inventories are now rebuilding, turning utilities from net sellers to net buyers. This transition from drawdown to rebuild is a structural bull catalyst. |
| Plutonium reprocessing / MOX | ~5 Mlbs/yr equiv. | Limited | Mixed oxide (MOX) fuel displaces some uranium demand in France and Japan. Japan’s post-Fukushima reactor restarts have been slow, limiting MOX deployment. Not a significant swing factor at current scale. |
Section I
The gap between what miners produce and what reactors consume has been the defining arithmetic of the uranium market for the past two decades. Mine production has never, in any recent year, fully covered reactor demand without secondary supply bridging the difference. As secondary supply sources shrink and reactor demand grows, the structural deficit gets harder to paper over. The charts and table below show how the consensus of institutions models that gap through 2035.
| Institution | 2026E spot ($/lb) | 2027E | 2030E | Key swing assumption |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UxC / TradeTech | $82–$101 | $90–$115 | $110–$140 | Utility recontracting pace; Kazatomprom RKAB quotas |
| Bank of America / Citi | $90–$135 | $115–$150 | $120–$160 | Financial buyer inflows; Russia-US export bifurcation |
| WNA / IEA | $75–$95 | $85–$110 | $100–$135 | China new build pace; SMR commercialization timelines |
| Fitch Solutions / BMI | $80–$95 | $85–$105 | $95–$120 | Kazakh logistics; Iran/Middle East supply disruption risk |
🟢 Bull — $120+/lb by 2027
$120–$150/lb
Kazatomprom supply shocks continue. Russia bans exports to West permanently. AI-driven data center demand leads to early reactor life extensions. Sprott (SPUT) maintains massive NAV premium.
Requires continued supply constraints + AI demand surge
🔵 Base — $85–$110/lb by 2027
$85–$110/lb
Gradual structural tightening. Kazatomprom meets 2026 guidance. Utility contracting remains steady at ~120M lbs/yr. New mine projects (Dasa, Tiris) reach commissioning on time.
Current institutional consensus
🔴 Bear — Range-bound $65–$80/lb
$65–$80/lb
Kazakh production surprises to upside. Geopolitical tensions ease, allowing Russian flow through workarounds. Reactor build delays in China. Financial buyers become net sellers to meet redemptions.
Requires KAP supply normalized + China delays
Section J
LSE:KAP / KASE:KZAP
Kazatomprom
State-owned · Republic of Kazakhstan · World’s largest uranium producer
67.18
Mlbs FY2025 (100%)
~43%
World share
ISR
Mining method
The single most important company in global uranium supply. All production uses ISR (in-situ recovery) — the lowest-cost method. Annual RKAB permit quota is the most market-moving supply event in uranium each year. Budenovskoye JV ramp-up has been a key driver of production growth. Cameco holds 40% of Inkai JV. Transit risk: historically Russia-routed, now shifting to Trans-Caspian route. LSE-listed GDR gives Western investor access.
TSX:CCO / NYSE:CCJ
Cameco Corporation
Canadian · Largest Western uranium producer · Integrated fuel services
21.0
Mlbs FY2025 (share)
~14%
Western share
Cigar+McAR
Key mines
The largest Western-controlled producer and most liquid equity for US investors. Key assets: Cigar Lake (83.33% operated) and McArthur River (70%). Owns 49% of Westinghouse (nuclear fuel services). Inkai JV (40%) recovered from brief Jan 2025 suspension. Cigar Lake Zone 4 extension under development. CCJ is the benchmark uranium equity for North American portfolios.
STATE · France
Orano
French state-owned · Integrated nuclear fuel cycle · Geopolitical complexity
~20
Mlbs/yr (est)
Kazakhstan
Primary (KATCO)
Niger ✗
Disrupted
Integrated fuel cycle company 90% owned by the French state. Key assets: KATCO JV (Kazakhstan, 49%) and 16.67% of Cigar Lake. Niger operations severely disrupted: junta expelled Orano from Somair in 2024 and revoked Imouraren permit. Developing Kiggavik (Nunavut) and Midwest (Saskatchewan) projects to offset African losses. Not publicly listed.
ASX/TSX:PDN
Paladin Energy
Australian · Langer Heinrich restart · Acquired Fission Uranium
~3.3
Mlbs/yr (LH)
Namibia
Langer Heinrich
Ramp issues
FY2025 challenges
Restarted Langer Heinrich (Namibia) in early 2024. FY2025 guidance withdrawn March 2025 due to weather and grade issues. Acquisition of Fission Uranium (Nov 2024) adds the Triple R deposit (Athabasca Basin) as a major development project. Expansion to 8 Mlbs/yr contingent on resolving current Phase 1 operational hurdles.
Section K
Uranium has had some of the most violent price cycles in commodity history. From $7/lb in 1998 to $136/lb in 2007. From $70/lb to $7/lb again after Fukushima. From $48/lb in 2020 to $106/lb in January 2024. Each cycle was driven by a specific mechanism — not random volatility. The 2003–2007 spike happened because the Megatons to Megawatts HEU downblend programme was set to end and no one had built new mines. The 2011–2016 crash happened because Germany shut 17 reactors in 10 days. The 2021–2024 rally happened because SPUT entered the spot market as a buyer at the same time utilities started recontracting. Understanding the mechanism behind each cycle is what separates a thesis from a guess.
| Period | Approx. range ($/lb) | Key driver |
|---|---|---|
| 1998–2004 | $7–$20 | Post-Cold War uranium glut; Soviet stockpiles flood market. Industry at distressed prices. |
| 2004–2007 | $20–$136 | Cigar Lake flooding (2006), anticipation of end of HEU programme. Largest speculative move. |
| 2007–2011 | $40–$75 | Correction from high. Demand thesis intact until Fukushima eve ($75/lb). |
| 2011–2016 | $7–$52 | Fukushima disaster. German exit and Japanese shutdowns create demand destruction. |
| 2016–2021 | $18–$50 | Slow recovery. Kazatomprom production cuts. SPUT IPO (Sep 2021) starts sustained rise. |
| 2021–2024 | $32–$106 | Physical buying by SPUT/Yellow Cake. Utility recontracting. Ukraine war supply fears. |
| 2024–present | $79–$86 | Correction from $106. US/Russian trade bans effective. Market digests supply recovery. |
Section L
September 2021
Sprott Physical Uranium Trust (SPUT) launches — changes the market
Sprott Asset Management converted the Uranium Participation Corp. into SPUT, an open-ended physical uranium fund that can buy unlimited spot material. By 2024 SPUT held ~56 Mlbs of U3O8, absorbing approximately two years of spot market volume. Financial buyers competing directly with utilities for physical uranium was a structural change with no parallel in any prior uranium cycle.
July 2023
Niger military coup — Orano operations disrupted
The junta that seized power in Niger subsequently expelled Orano from Somair operations and revoked the Imouraren permit. Niger had previously supplied ~5% of world uranium. Orano recognised impairment charges. The GoviEx Madaouela project licence was also revoked. Global Atomic’s Dasa project has separate regulatory standing but added country-risk overhang.
August 11, 2024
US Prohibits Russian Uranium Imports
The Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act signed into law, effective August 11 2024. Bans US utilities from importing Russian-origin enriched uranium products. Waivers available through 2027 for utilities that cannot source alternatives. The ban accelerates US domestic enrichment investment (Centrus LEU+, URENCO USA expansion) and drives demand for Western services.
November 15, 2024
Russia retaliates — export restrictions on uranium
Russia’s government introduced export restrictions on uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to “unfriendly states.” Pre-existing long-term contracts may be honoured under specific licenses. The restrictions effectively ended new Russian uranium supply to Western utilities. Rosatom’s position in the West is being unwound over a 3–7 year transition.
January 2025
Inkai JV briefly suspended — Cameco/KAP shipment disruption
Kazatomprom’s Inkai JV (40% Cameco) was suspended for approximately 3 weeks in January 2025 due to a dispute over the Trans-Caspian logistics route. Recovered and FY2025 full-year output reached 8.4 Mlbs (Cameco share). Incident highlighted the ongoing logistics vulnerability of Kazakh uranium exports.
Ongoing
Uranium supply chain bifurcation: Western vs Russian/Chinese
The global uranium supply chain is gradually bifurcating. Western utilities are reducing Russian/Chinese exposure (enrichment, fuel fabrication, uranium origin). Kazakhstan — which supplies both Western and Chinese utilities — sits at a geopolitical fault line. How Kazakhstan balances these relationships as US/European sanctions pressure increases is the longest-duration geopolitical risk in the uranium market.
Section M
Uranium moves on a small number of identifiable signals — more than nickel and less than copper. The RKAB quota announcement from Kazatomprom and the UxC weekly spot price capture the majority of short-term movements. Current readings for all six are synchronized with April 2026 market data.
| Signal | Direction | Live reading (April 2026) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kazatomprom RKAB quota | Restrictive | 2026 production guidance remains conservative despite higher prices. Focus remains on value over volume to maintain market balance. | KAP Press Release |
| U3O8 spot price trend | Neutral → | Currently $83.90/lb. Consolidating after the Jan 2026 peak of $101.41. Long-term contract price has climbed to $90/lb. | UxC Weekly |
| Utility contracting pace | Active | LT contracting volumes are at 15-year highs. Western utilities prioritizing security of supply over price sensitivity. | UxC Survey |
| SPUT / YCA physical buying | Aggressive | SPUT holdings: 81.25 Mlbs. Trust purchased over 5M lbs in Q1 2026 following prospectus renewal. | Fund Reports |
| Reactor fleet status | Bullish | 65 reactors under construction. Life extensions (Japan/Korea) and AI data center demand are offsetting retirements. | IAEA PRIS |
| Russian supply chain access | Restricted | US ban fully in effect. Russian retaliatory export restrictions on UF6 have bifurcated the enrichment market. | US DOE / Rosatom |
Section N
Uranium is unusual in that retail investors can get actual physical exposure — through SPUT and Yellow Cake, which hold real U3O8 in licensed storage — or equity exposure through a range of ETFs and individual stocks. The physical trusts track spot uranium directly. The equity ETFs add operational leverage (and company-specific risk). The right mix depends on whether you want commodity exposure or operating leverage.
URNM
Sprott Uranium Miners ETF
Equity ETF · NYSE Arca
0.75%/yr. Tracks the North Shore Global Uranium Mining Index. ~25 holdings. Top weights: Cameco (21%), SPUT (12%), NexGen (12%). The benchmark uranium equity ETF with ~$2.4B AUM. Includes producers, developers, and physical exposure.
U.UN / U.U
Sprott Physical Uranium Trust (SPUT)
Physical U3O8 trust · TSX
Holds physical U3O8 in licensed storage.81.2 Mlbs holdings as of April 2026. The most direct uranium price exposure. Monitor NAV premium/discount as a market sentiment signal for new buying intent.
YCA
Yellow Cake plc
Physical U3O8 trust · LSE AIM
UK-listed holding company with an agreement to purchase up to $100M/yr from Kazatomprom. Holds23.1 Mlbs U3O8. Raised ~$110M in Q1 2026 to exercise purchase options. Direct access for UK/European investors.
NLR
VanEck Uranium + Nuclear ETF
Equity ETF · NYSE Arca
0.61%/yr. Broader exposure including nuclear utilities (Constellation, PG&E) alongside miners. Benefits from AI data center power demand. Lower volatility than pure mining ETFs. ~$4.1B AUM.
CCJ
Cameco Corporation
Individual stock · NYSE
The primary blue-chip individual stock for US investors. S&P 500 constituent. 49% owner of Westinghouse. Highly liquid proxy for the sector with significant operating leverage.
UEC
Uranium Energy Corp
Individual stock · NYSE American
US-focused ISR producer. Largest pure-play US uranium producer. Significant beneficiary of the 2024 Russian import ban and incentives for domestic production. High-beta development exposure.
| Instrument | Type | Exchange | Holdings (Apr '26) | US-accessible? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SPUT (U.UN) | Physical trust | TSX | 81.2 Mlbs | Via OTC (SRUUF) or URNM |
| Yellow Cake (YCA) | Physical trust | LSE AIM | 23.1 Mlbs | Via OTC (YLLXF) |
| URNM ETF | Equity ETF | NYSE Arca | ~25 stocks + SPUT | ✓ Direct NYSE listing |
| NLR ETF | Equity ETF | NYSE Arca | Utilities + Miners | ✓ Direct NYSE listing |
Section O
Uranium is quoted in different units across different markets: USD/lb U3O8 (UxC spot), USD/kgU (IAEA, IEA, European markets), and occasionally USD/MTU (metric tonne uranium). This calculator converts between units and estimates the value of uranium holdings.
| USD/lb U3O8 | USD/kgU | USD/MTU | Value of 1 Mlbs | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $7/lb | $8.33/kgU | $8,330/MTU | $7M | Post-Fukushima trough (2016) |
| $48/lb | $57.14/kgU | $57,140/MTU | $48M | 2020 cycle low (pre-SPUT) |
| $65/lb | $77.38/kgU | $77,380/MTU | $65M | Estimated incentive price (new mine) |
| ~$82/lb | ~$43.86/kgU | ~$43,860/MTU | $82M | Current spot (live) |
| $106/lb | $126.19/kgU | $126,190/MTU | $106M | Jan 2024 cycle peak |
| $136/lb | $161.90/kgU | $161,900/MTU | $136M | Jun 2007 ATH |
Conversion: USD/kgU = (USD/lb U3O8) × 1,000 ÷ 2,204.62 ÷ 0.8480 (U3O8 is 84.80% uranium by weight). 1 MTU = 1,000 kgU.
Section P
Editorial note
This page tracks 227 uranium assets across 10 countries and is updated regularly with price and production data from UxC, TradeTech, Kazatomprom, Cameco, USGS, IEA, IAEA, and World Nuclear Association. Data sources: UxC (spot/LT prices), TradeTech (conversion/SWU), Kazatomprom annual reports, USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, IAEA PRIS database, WNA. This is information, not financial advice. Last reviewed: April 2026.